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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
FEDERAL CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE FRAN-

CHISE TAX ON FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS ENGAGED

IN -[United

States] In Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier,' appellant, a
Maryland corporation, owned and operated a pipe line for oil extending from Oklahoma, through Missouri, to a point in Illinois. No
oil was received or delivered in Missouri. Appellant had charter
powers (from Maryland) to operate telegraph and telephone lines,
and to deal in and transport merchandise, as well as to pipe oil, and
could conduct these activities in both intra- and interstate commerce. It paid for and obtained from Missouri a license to engage
exclusively in the business of piping crude oil (which apparently
gave the right to do this in both intra- and interstate commerce),
and this license, under Missouri law, carried with it the power of
eminent domain. The company maintained its principal office in
Missouri and never did or attempted to do anything but an interstate oil pipe line business in Missouri. It paid general property
taxes on all of its assets in Missouri. A Missouri statute- required
every foreign corporation engaged in business in Missouri to pay
an annual franchise tax of one-tenth of one per cent of the proportion of its capital stock and surplus that its assets in the state bore
to all of its assets. Appellant, having refused to make to the state
tax commission such a required report as would give the data for
this assessment, was threatened with revocation of its license and
tax proceedings that would encumber its property. Its bill for an
injunction was dismissed by the federal District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which reversed the dismissal, Mr. Justice Brandeis
dissenting.
The majority proceeded upon the familiar ground that a tax
upon the mere franchise or right to do interstate business is invalid,
which, properly understood, has been respectable law since Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvan 3 and PhiladelphiaS. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania.4 The real question of course was whether the case fell
within the "proper understanding" of the general proposition.
(a) If the franchise is that of a domestic corporation and
the tax is measured by the corporate property (even if property
outside of the state be included) the tax is valid. See Kansas City,
etc., Ry. v. Botkin5-where there was a maximum limit to the tax;
and Kansas City, etc., R. R. v. Stiles6-where there was no maxi1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

(1925)
(1919)
(1885)
(1887)
(1916)
(1916)

45 Sup. Ct. 184.
Mo. Rev. Stats. secs. 9836-48.
114 U. S. 196.
122 U. S. 326.
240 U. S. 227.
242 U. S. 111.
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mum. This distinction between the franchises of domestic and
foreign corporations-even though both be solely engaged in interstate commerce-was
early noticed in Philadelphia S. S. Co. v.
7
Pennsylvania.

(b) Or, if the franchise be that of a domestic corporation, it
may be measured in at least any reasonable manner by the amount
of business done by the use of such franchise (including interstate
business)

."

(c)
Or, if the franchise, whether domestic or foreign (not
being granted by the United States) and whether used to carry on
interstate or intrastate business, is used in the taxing state and is
valued as a part of the corporation's property there, it may be subjected to a property tax. 9
(d) Or, if the tax, though in terms on the privilege or franchise of doing business (even of a foreign corporation), is in fact a
tax on the corporate property within the state (as indicated by the
method of its ascertainment, and particularly if it is in lieu of all
other property taxes), it is valid, even though the business done and
included in the mode of measurement of the tax is in whole or part
interstate commerce.' 0
Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissent went on the ground that the tax
was really on the privilege of doing business in corporate form
under the Missouri license, with the added power of eminent domain; that the license conferred the power to do intrastate business,
though none was in fact done; and that the amount of the tax was
too small appreciably to burden interstate commerce. So far as the
mere privilege of doing interstate business in corporate form is
concerned it may be said that Missouri could not interfere with this
and that the license gave no power not already possessed. So far
as it purported to give intrastate powers it was effective, though
appellant made no use of such powers in fact. If appellant had
obtained a license in this form, in order that it might be enabled to
do intrastate business should it so desire, it could be argued that
the Missouri tax was valid within the case of Ficklin v. Shelby Co.
Taxing District,"' where Tennessee was allowed to tax the business
of a broker for a particular year in which he obtained a license to
do a general (state and interstate) business, though in that year he
chanced to do only interstate business. On the other hand, if
appellant sought to do and did no intrastate business it could not be
7. (1887) 122 U. S. at 342 if.
8. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. (1891) 142 U. S. 217; Wisconsin & Mich.
R. R. v. Powers (1903). 191 U. S. 379 (tax on "property and business").
9. Atlantic & Pacific Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia (1903) 190 U. S. 160;
Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Gottlieb (1903) 190 U. S. 412; St. Louis S. W.
Ry v. Arkansas (1914) 235 U. S. 350, 365; St. Louis-San Fran. Ry. v. Middlekamp (1921) 256 U. S. 226, 231; St. Louis, etc., Elec. Ry. v. Missouri (1921)
256 U. S. 314, 318.
10. Postal Teleg. Co. v. Adams (1895) 155 U. S. 688; United States
Express Co. v. Minnesota (1912) 223 U. S. 335; McHenry v. Alford (1898)
168 U. S. 651; Wisconsin & Mic. R. R. v. Powers (1903) 191 U. S.379.
11. (1892) 145 U. S. 1.
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The facts of the
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principal case do not show
ness if opportunity offered, and probably the license was in a single
standard form covering both. The majority of the court put Missouri's power to tax "upon what was done and not upon what might
have been done.""'
The majority also denied that Missouri's grant of, the power of
eminent domain could be a foundation for the tax. Perhaps it is
this privilege.
enough to say that the tax law did not purport to tax
4
Compare American Smelting, etc., Co. v. Colorado' where a form
of state taxation of a foreign corporation that could have been
enacted by way of amendment of its charter was held bad because
not purporting to operate as such an amendment but as a general
law violating the obligation- of contracts. If Missouri's law had
purported to tax or to impose a condition upon the power of eminent
domain (which the state could arbitrarily withhold), and had measof property. in the state)
ured the impost as it did (by the amount
5
validity.
its
deny
to
difficult
be
would
it
Were it not for the decisions of the Missouri courts, a very
respectable case could be made for the validity of the Missouri tax
under proposition (d), above. If, though the business were solely
interstate commerce, the tax on the franchise to do it (being measured solely by property in the state) had been in lieu of all other
taxes (and so construable as really a property tax) it would have
been valid."" Nor would it have been objectionable that, construed
as a property tax, it was levied at a higher rate on pipe lines than
on other property, for the state's power to classify for taxation includes the right to make the rates different on different sorts of
property ;17 and this inequality of rate may take the form of double
taxation.' 8 For the same reason, if the state had levied two separate
ad valorem property taxes upon the Missouri assets of the appellant,
it would not have violated the Constitution if their total amount was
not greater than one such tax could have been. Why, then, may
the state not levy one property tax in the ordinary ad valorem form,
and another in the form of a franchise tax measured by property
in the state-the sum of the two taxes not being more than could
have been exacted either (1) by a franchise tax in lieu of all other
taxes, or (2) by two separate ad valorem taxes? In St. Louis S. W.

12. Stockard v. Morgan (1902) 185 U. S. 27.

13. 45 S. Ct. at p. 187.
14. (1907) 204 U. S. 103, 114.

15. California v. Cent. Pacific R. R. (1888) 127 U. S. 1, 40-42; Cent.
Pacific R. R. v. California (1896) 162 U. S. 91; Railroad Co. v. Maryland
143 U. S.
(1875) 21 Wall. 456; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York (1892) St.
Ry. v.
305; Ashley v. Ryan (1894) 153 U. S. 436; Interstate Consol.
Massachusetts (1907) 207 U. S.79; Kansas City, etc., R. R. v. Stiles (1916)
242 U. S.111; 1. P. Hall (1907) in IL. LAW REv. 2:21.
16. See note 10 above.
17. Mich. Cent. Ry. v. P4wers (1906) 201 U. S. 245, 300; Ohio Tax

Cases (1914) 232 U. S.576.
18. Patton v. Brady (1902) 184 U. S.608. As to more subtle forms
of double taxation, see Hall "Cases on Const. Law" 606 note.
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Ry. v. Arkansas'9 an ordinary property tax and a franchise tax
(measured by property within the state) on the doing of intrastate
business were both upheld as against the Fourteenth Amendment.
Should they not also be upheld as against the commerce clause,
provided only that the franchise tax can be fairly construed as in
substance only an additional property tax (being measured in a way
appropriate for a property tax)? It might even be urged that if
the Missouri property tax here was only upon the local assets of the
appellant, without regard to their increased value as a going concern, the franchise tax was not even double taxation, but was merely
designed to reach this surplus property value. See the reasoning in
20
Galveston, etc., Ry. v. Texas.
The practical difficulty with such a view is of course chiefly
one of interpretation, and in the principal case this seems insuperable
in view of the explicit decision of the Missouri Supreme Court that
this tax is on the right to do business and not on property. 2' Nor
was it on the privilege of exercising the power of eminent domain,
which might also have been valid. On this ground, then, the case
is readily defensible, leaving still open some of the possibilities suggested above for upholding a similarly worded tax whose interpretation is not unfavorably foreclosed by state decisions.
JAMES PARKER HALL,

SALES-INTEREST RETAINED BY ALLEGED SELLER ON BANK-

RUPTCY- Or ALLEGED BUYER.-

[Federal]

In a recent federal case

in the Southern District of Illinois' the question is once more raised

as to the respective rights of the unpaid seller who has attempted to
retain some hold on the goods on the one hand and the claims of

the creditors of the alleged bankrupt buyer on the other. The peti-

tioner, a manufacturer of wire, had sent a quantity of its product
to the bankrupt under a contract in which these parties were always
respectively referred to as the seller and the buyer. Storage and
insurance charges were to be met by the buyer, who was also to
have the risk of loss. In the event of loss the reimbursement should
be on the basis of the market price prevailing at the time of the loss.
Sales reports were to be made monthly and the amounts due were
to be based on the prices in effect at the time such sales were made.
If the buyer wished to terminate the arrangement he could only do
so by purchasing the stock then in his possession at the then prevailing prices. It was also expressly stated that the wire should
remain the property of the seller, who was to be at liberty to reclaim
it in the event of the buyer's insolvency. The court adopts as its
opinion the report of the special master, holding the petitioner not
entitled to reclaim the goods.
The discussion is opened by the statement that the question is
whether this contract is one of bailment or agency, or whether it is
19. (1914) 235 U. S. 350, 364-68.
20. (1908) 210 U. S. 217, 226.
21. Missouri v. State Tax Commission (1920) 282 Mo. 213, 218, 234.
1. In re United States Electrical Supply Company (1924) 2 F. (2d) 378.

